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ABSTRACT 
I discuss what the government can do and has 
done to reach its equity-oriented policy targets 
concerning the geographical distribution of 
physicians in the municipality health service. 
Current policies has been inadequate to solve the 
problems. Securing an adequate supply of 
physicians seems to be a cruical policy tool. 
Forecasts in the 80s mistakenly predicted a future 
oversupply of physicians. The education capacity 
was reduced. The physician shortage was severe 
during the 1990s. The forecasts used in planning 
today are based on dubious assumptions. Cost-
benefit analyses with a risk averseness perspective 
can provide more suitable information for 
deciding what the education capacity for 
physicians should be.
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DEFINITIONS 
Commonly used abbreviations: 
RTV: Rikstrygdeverket. The National Insurance Organisation. 
FLO: Fastlegeordningen. The list patient system, introduced in 2001. 
KS: Kommunenes Sentralforbund. Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. 
DNLF: Den Norske Lægeforening. The Norwegian Medical Association. 
TDNLF: Tidsskrift for Den Norske Lægeforening. Journal of the Norwegian Medical 
Association. 
SSB: Statistisk Sentralbyrå. Statistics Norway. 
HD: Helsedepartementet. The Ministry of Health1. 
FFS: Fee-for-service. 
GP: General practitioner, general physicist, family doctor. 
SHDir: Sosial- og Helsedirektoratet. The Norwegian Directorate for Social and Health Affairs. 
SAFH: Statens Autorisasjonskontor for Helsepersonell. The Norwegian Registration Authority 
for Health Personnel. 
 
Use of terms: 
When I refer to ‘specialists with private practice’, I mean non-GP specialists. Specialized and 
non-specialized GPs belong to the primary health service, whereas the specialists I refer to 
when using the term in that context belong to the domain of the specialist health service. 
I use the terms ‘municipality health service’ and ‘primary health service’ interchangeably when 
refereeing to the municipality health service. 
Municipalities need to employ physicians for administrative and community health purposes. 
In many cases I do not distinguish between these type of positions and GP positions when I 
refer to physician positions in municipalities throughout the text. 
When I use the term ‘government’, I refer to all government levels, including the central 
government and municipalities. 
I use ‘stability’ and ‘stable’ to refer to the property of having physicians that stay in their 
positions for a long time. For example, by ‘a stable municipality’ I mean a municipality with 
low turnover in its physician workforce.  
 
Cross-references 
The text contains many cross-references. Selected paragraphs are numbered to make cross-
referencing easy. The first digit in the paragraph numbers refer to the chapter where the 
paragraph belongs. The paragraph count restarts in each chapter. 
                                                                 
1 What I refer to as The Ministry of Health has had various official names up through the years according to how the areas of 
responsibilites have been distributed between the ministries. I refer to the ministry that at the time had responsibility for the health 
service. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
The topic discussed in this thesis is the Norwegian 
physician market policy. I define physician market 
policy as the policies used by the government to 
come closer to reaching its policy targets concerning 
the geographical distribution of physicians. Key 
questions are: What policies has the government 
used to address the political challenges related to the 
physician distribution? What is the political action 
space in this area? Are the measures currently used 
suitable and sufficient to reach the policy targets? I 
focus on the last ten to twenty years, and draw lines 
further back in time when appropriate. I look at the 
geographical distribution of physicians in the 
municipality health service only. My main focus is 
on aspects related to the aggregate level of demand 
and supply for physicians. 
The geographical physician coverage in Norway has 
always been a political concern, particularly because 
of difficulties in recruiting physicians to rural areas. 
The Norwegian welfare state is based on equity 
oriented distribution goals for public services, 
including health services. To quote the accession 
manifest for the centre-left coalition currently in 
government (the Soria Moria-declaration): “Everyone 
should have access to equally good health- and caretaking 
services, independently of personal economic situation or 
place of residence.”2. With such policy targets, 
geographical differences in the quality of health 
services becomes a source for social inequity. 
If health services are to be equitably distributed, the 
physicians that provide health services need to be 
distributed according to the same equity principle. A 
good physician market policy promotes social 
justice, because it makes the distribution of 
physicians and consequently the distribution of 
health services more equitable. 
A special property of the GP-patient relation is that 
the quality of GP services has been found to be 
dependant on the duration of the relation. Scott 
                                                                 
2 The source document is “Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet 
mellom Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti og Senterpartiet 
2005-09.“ The quote in Norwegian is ”Alle skal ha tilgang til gode og 
likeverdige helse- og omsorgstjenester, uavhengig av personlig 
økonomi og bosted.”. 
(2000) discusses this and has further references. In 
some areas in Norway, mainly rural, this can be a 
major problem. Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) and 
Abelsen and Bæck (2005), which I present in more 
detail in chapter 3, both talk about stability in the 
physician work force as being the most crucial target 
for rural municipalities when they recruit physicians. 
One of the goals of the list patient reform has been to 
promote stability in GP-patient relations. 
It is not clear whether the government's policy target 
regarding the distribution of health services is ensure 
equal access to health services or the provision of 
health services according to need. The manifest 
quoted above for example, only state equity in access 
as a policy goal. On the other hand SHDir have 
developed a plan of action to reduce social 
inequalities in health3, which implies a need-oriented 
distribution goal. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) 
discuss why there is a possible conflict between the 
equal access and provision according to need policy 
goals. I quote from page 1813, paragraph 2.2.2: 
“...equality of access will not necessarily result in health 
care being allocated according to need, or in the 
attainment of – or even promotion of – equality of health.” 
and from page 1814, under paragraph 2.2.3: 
“Contrary to what appears to be believed in many policy-
making circles, then, one cannot logically espouse 
simultaneously equality of access, allocation according to 
need, and equality of health. A choice has to be made.”  
This implies that whether the Norwegian 
government's distribution target for health services is 
provision according to need or equality of access has 
consequences for how the physicians that provide 
the health services should be distributed 
geographically. (There is also a possible conflict 
between policies related to upholding the population 
level in rural areas on one hand and equity in the 
distribution of health care on the other hand4). 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) also discuss why 
                                                                 
3 “The Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social Affairs’ Plan of 
Action to Reduce Social Inequalities in Health: The Challenge of the 
Gradient.” SHDir 2005. 
4 As an illustration: According to a newspaper report, the minister 
for regional affairs in 1994, Gunnar Berge, gave the following 
answer when asked to comment on the differences between a poor 
central municipality and a rich remote municipality: ”I understand 
that inequalities can be provocative, but it is a national [political] 
target to maintain the population pattern.” In norwegian “ Jeg 
forstår at ulikheter kan virke provoserende, men det er et nasjonalt 
mål å beholde bosetningsmønsteret.” Source: Aftenposten 
27.10.1997 “De økonomiske ulikhetene er store”. 
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any of these policy targets may involve a rejection of 
the Pareto criteria. I quote from page 1815: “In short, 
acceptance of the Paretian value judgements seem to be 
inconsistent with a desire to equalize access to medical 
care. Or, to put it the other way around, a desire to 
equalize access suggests a rejection of the Paretian value 
judgements.”  
When the political target for how health services and 
physicians should be distributed is unclear, it 
becomes difficult to evaluate to what extent the 
physician distribution is in accordance with the 
politically targeted distribution. Furthermore; in the 
empirical chapter I discuss methodological problems 
for adapting an equity oriented approach given the 
data I have available (the discussion starts in 
paragraph 5.4). These two issues makes it 
problematic for me to adapt an approach were the 
physician density is evaluated according to what 
extent it is equitable in the sense of being distributed 
according to the population’s demand for GP 
services or health status. Besides, it has partly been 
done arleady: Carlsen (2006) is an empirical study 
that builds on a very extensive data material. He 
discusses equity in GP distribution - according to 
need. 
Instead I choose to take the governments’ demand 
for physicians as it can be observed through 
occupied or vacant physician positions as granted, 
and treat that as the normative goal for how the 
physician distribution should be. I assume that the 
government wants to avoid geographically 
systematic differences between central and rural 
areas in GP position vacancy rates and in the 
instability of GPs, and that any such pattern is a 
source for inequity. Specifically, I operationalize the 
government's policy targets to be: to minimize the 
number of vacant physician positions, to avoid 
geographically systematic variation in GP position 
vacancies and in the instability of GPs along the 
center-periphery axis and to maximize the stability 
of GPs. Carlsen (2006) justifies this 
operationalization, because he finds that low quality 
in GP services is related to instability in the GP 
workforce, thereby validifying the treatment of 
differences in GP stability as a source for inequity. 
Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) and Abelsen and Bæck 
(2005) give strong support to the notion that vacancy 
rates and instability in physician positions are closely 
related. Aakvik and Holmås (2005) find that there is 
a significant relationship between mortality and 
physician vacancies but not between mortality and 
physician work years at municipality level in 
Norway. This supports looking at vacancy rates 
instead of physician work years. 
To summarize: I discuss physician market policies on 
the area of promoting a socially geographically 
equitable GP distribution. I assume observed 
physician positions as the normative goal, and that 
the government wants to avoid vacant GP positions 
and unstable GPs and inequities in the distribution 
of those two. 
The next chapter contains a chronological 
presentation of institutional changes, policy 
measures and other events pertinent to the problem 
for discussion. Next there is a literature review 
chapter, where I present selected research concerning 
the physician market. In the proceeding theoretical 
analysis chapter I present a theoretical framework 
and use it to analyze different policy measures. In 
the empirical chapter I use descriptive statistics to 
look at trends in the physician market. In the final 
chapter I provide policy recommendations and 
suggest topics for further research. 
Chapter 2: PRESENTATION OF 
EVENTS 
This chapter contains a chronological presentation of 
relevant institutional developments and policy 
measures. In the end there is a figure with an 
overview followed by a summary of the most 
important trends. 
Norway has a dispersed population pattern. The 
travel distances within municipalities and from 
municipalities to the closest hospital can be long. In 
2001 there were 435 municipalities. The median 
population size of municipalities that year was 4358. 
The municipalities carry the responsibility to 
organize the municipality health service, of which 
the primary health service and GPs are a part.  
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2.1 In the 1970s all hospitals were required to have a 
permit from the Health Directorate for each 
physician position. The regulation was not effective – 
hospitals disregarded the permit system and hired 
physicians illicitly. From 1979 to 1983 all new 
physician positions in central parts of the country 
required a permit from a government-appointed 
council5. (Buhaug (1997)) 
2.2 In 1983 a government report6 predicted that there 
would be a future oversupply of physicians in 
Norway. (Skoglund og Taraldset (2000) discuss these 
mispredictions further.) Subsequently the domestic 
education capacity for physicians was reduced, and 
the funding for tuition fees for Norwegian medical 
students abroad was removed.  
2.3 The municipalities have had the responsibility for 
the GP service since 1984, when the municipality 
health service bill7 took effect. They also have the 
responsibility for emergency physician services, 
nursing care, health station services and other 
community health service duties. 
After 1984, with the municipality health service bill, 
the funding for physicians with private practice had 
three components. They received FFS funding from 
RTV. If they had a contract or agreement with a 
municipality or county, they also received a block 
grant based on the size of amenities and number of 
auxiliary personnel in the practice. User payments 
were the third income source. Physicians were free to 
establish private practices without any agreement 
with a municipality or county. They would still 
receive the FFS refunds. These private practices 
without government contract were mainly located in 
the most central parts of the country. In rural or 
small municipalities GPs were commonly hired as 
ordinary employees paid by the hour, instead of 
having private practices. 
2.4 In 1988 the Parliament passed a bill that granted 
the government, specifically HD, wide powers over 
                                                                 
5 Ot.prp. nr. 16 (1978-1979) “Om midlertidig lov om adgang til 
regulering av legetjenester.” Case number 1230286 in the archives at 
www.odin.dep.no. 
6 "Utdanningskapasiteten for leger og fysioterapeuter. Fra en 
interdepartemental arbeidsgruppe nedsatt mai 1982, Formann Egil 
Willumsen." Oslo, Sosialdepartementet, 1982. 
7 “Lov av 1982-11-19 nr. 66 om helsetjenesten i kommunene”. 
the physician market8. The purpose was to remedy 
the difficulties rural municipalities had in recruiting 
physicians. The bill included a general moratorium 
on establishing new physician positions, including 
privately financed positions. Under the bill the 
government could overrule the hiring of physicians 
to existing positions, and command physicians to 
take specific positions. The bill was replaced by an 
agreement in 1989 (Legefordelingsavtalen – The 
Physician Distribution Agreement9). The agreement 
was between KS, the municipality of Oslo and 
DNLF. HD later joined. Under this agreement all 
municipalities and hospitals were required to apply 
to a council, consisting of appointees from the 
agreement partners, for a permit before they could 
establish a new physician position. The idea behind 
this agreement, and the similar regulation in effect 
prior to 1983 referred to in paragraph 2.1 above, was 
to limit the number of available physician positions 
in central areas in order to make physicians accept 
employment in more rural parts of the country. 
(Buhaug (1997)) 
2.5 In the beginning of the 1990s the policy of 
reducing the education capacity of physicians from 
the mid-1980s was reversed. The number of students 
admitted to Norwegian medical schools was 
increased throughout the 1990s. I have not found 
accurate annual figures on the number of students 
admitted to Norwegian medical schools. The figures 
in Stølen et al (2002) indicate an increase close to 
100% from 1990 (310 students) to 1998 (594 students). 
However, those figures include the student capacity 
bought at foreign universities discussed in 
paragraph 2.13. 
2.6 The tuition fee scholarships for Norwegians 
studying medicine abroad were reintroduced in the 
beginning of the 1990s10. 
2.7 Prior to 1992 physicians, including GPs, could 
freely establish private practices in any part of the 
country and receive FFS funding from RTV. The 
Parliament in 1992 decided to remove FFS funding to 
                                                                 
8 Ot.prp. nr. 36 (1987-1988) “Om midlertidig lov om stillingsstopp 
for leger m.v.” Case number 1320212 in the archives at  
www.odin.dep.no. 
9 The agreement was later renegotiated. The 1995 version is 
reproduced in Buhaug (1997). 
10 Most likely around 1992, but I have not found an accurate source. 
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private physician practices without a contract with 
the government established after October 
199211.Those established before this date would still 
receive the FFS funding. According to a news report, 
the purpose was to save money and limit the number 
of physicians in central areas of the country12. 
2.8 There has been a common Nordic labor market 
for physicians since 1965 (Skoglund et al. (2005)). In 
1994 Norway entered the EU's inner market through 
the EEA agreement. The agreement involves free 
flow of labour, and has made it easier for physicians 
from the EU to seek employment in Norway. 
2.9 In 1994 KS and DNLF made an agreement that 
allowed for planned overtime, and standard work-
weeks for physicians of more than the standard 37.5 
hours13. According to DNLF, in 1994 the average 
work week for physicians at hospitals was 49 hours, 
63 hours if time on resting alert duty14 was included. 
The average salary for hospital specialists including 
overtime payment was NOK 400 000.15 
2.10 Between 1995 and 1998 physicians working at 
hospitals received large wage increases. Table 1 
shows the development of the average monthly total 
salary for employees with physician education 
employed in municipalities and counties. The figures 
are taken directly from the PAI-statistics publications 
and adjusted for inflation with 1998 as reference 
year. The PAI-statistics are published annually by KS 
and are based on the municipalities’ accounting 
                                                                 
11 Ot.prp. nr. 6 (1992-1993) ”Endringer i lov 17 juni 1966 nr 12 om 
folketrygd og i visse andre lover.” Case number 1370010 in the 
archives at  www.odin.dep.no. 
12 NTB (Norwegian Telegram Bureau) November 30 1992 
“Refusjonsordningene for leger strammes inn”. 
13 As source, see for example 
http://www.ssb.no/helsetjko/om.html (at least as per september 
2006) which is part of the documentation for the municipality 
physician work year data I use in the empirical chapter: ”Overtid 
skal generelt ikkje takast med, men for legane vart det frå 
statistikkåret 1994 også inkludert timeverk etter avtaler om forlenga 
arbeidstid (sentral forbundsvis særavtale mellom Kommunenes 
sentralforbund og Den Norske Lægeforening). Denne avtalen opnar 
for at ein, for inntil eitt år om gongen, inngår avtale om forlenga 
arbeidstid utover 37,5 timar i veka.” In English: ”Overtime should 
generally not be included, but for physicians work hours from 
planned overtime are included – as per the Central Unionwise 
Special Agreement between KS and DNLF”. This agreement makes 
it possible for physicians to arrange with their employers to have 
regular work weeks extending 37.5 hours.” 
14 ”hvilende vakt” 
15 Source: Bergens Tidende February 17 1994 ”Leger tvinges til 
overtid”. The newspaper quotes a DNLF staff member on the 
figures. 
figures16. Physicians with a municipal contract and 
private practice are not included. The hospitals are 
not included for 2001. The drop in salary from 2000 
to 2001 indicates that hospital physicians on average 
had a higher salary than physicians employed in 
municipalities. Baltagi et al. (2003) also use data from 
the PAI-register. They calculate the average hourly 
wage for physicians working in hospitals only. 
Table 1 Salary development for physicians 1993-
2001 (based on PAI-data). 1998 NOK. 
Year 
Total averag 
 monthly salary 
for all physicians 
in the PAI-register 
Average 
hourly wage 
for physicians 
working at 
hospitals 
1993 32349 186 
1994 32532 187 
1995 31988 191 
1996 36952 221 
1997 38369 221 
1998 41694 - 
1999 41119 - 
2000 41390 - 
2001 32472 (excl. hospitals) - 
It is unclear whether the data on which these figures 
are based include all extra payments from overtime 
and shift work. For this reason, they might be 
underestimating the increase around 1996. A 
newspaper article from 1997 says that calculations 
based on the negotiation results points towards an 
increase in salary for physicians in the period 1995-
1997 of around 40%17. According to Askildsen and 
Holmås (2004) the salary increase from 1995 to 1996 
was considerably higher for assistant physicians than 
for consultant physicians. 
2.11 Prior to 1997 hospitals were financed by block 
grants. In 1997 an activity-based reimbursement 
system for hospitals was introduced. 
                                                                 
16 KS (1992-2000): “Kommunale Arbeidstakere. Lønns- og 
personalstatistikk. Hovedoversikt.” Kommuneforlaget, Oslo. 
Annual editions 1993-2002. PAI is an acronym for personnel 
administrative information. 
17 Dagbladet June 5 1997 “Men legene er fortsatt i streikehumør” is 
the source for the 40% figure. See also Dagbladet June 19 1997 
”Dagbladet avslører Hernes’ hemmelige spill – legenes 
lønnsoppgjør avgjort på forhånd”. 
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2.12 From 1997 to 2004 The Norwegian Labour 
Administration (Aetat) actively recruited health 
personnel, including physicians, from selected 
foreign countries. Germany was the most important 
target country. The recruitees were given job 
interviews, employment contracts and language 
courses in their home country prior to arriving in 
Norway. Only personnel planning to stay at least 12 
months were recruited by the project18. 
2.13 From 1997 to 2005 the government bought 
education capacity at foreign medical schools. The 
application routines were facilitated and were the 
same as for Norwegian medical schools.19 
2.14 In 1997 the Parliament decided to terminate the 
FFS funding to all specialist physicians in private 
practices that did not have a contract with the 
government20. The GPs were exempted because the 
list patient reform was forthcoming. This change did 
not have any immediate effect on the number of 
specialist practitioners, since funding were provided 
for the counties to give existing specialists with 
practices contracts. 
2.15 Starting at the beginning of the 1990s, there was 
a development towards permitting private 
companies to rent out health personnel and 
otherwise intermediate in the job market for health 
personnel. In 1993 these activities were not allowed 
except for companies with special permits. The 
government became less restrictive in issuing 
permits throughout the 1990s, chiefly because of 
pressure from the health service sector21. From 
January 1998 private companies were allowed to 
intermediate between Norwegian employers and 
foreign physicians. Renting out health personnel was 
                                                                 
18 Source: “Evalueringsrapport for Aetat helserekruttering (1998-
2001)”, aquired from The Norwegian Labour Administration (Aetat) 
in 2003. 
19 The Norwegian Medical Journal has a feature article about this: 
”Vårt femte fakultet” by Geir Jacobsen, . TDNLF no. 8 2000 (volume 
120) page 2326. 
20 Ot.prp. nr. 47 (1996-1997) ”Endringer i lov 28. februar 1997 nr. 19 
om folketrygd (Avvikling av refusjoner til helsepersonell uten 
driftsavtale - oppretting av flere driftsavtaler for 
privatpraktiserende helsepersonell.)” Case number 1410276 in the 
archives at www.odin.dep.no. 
21 See for example Aftenposten July 24 1996 "Arg på formidlings-
forbud" where an HD representative expresses opinions in favor of 
letting private companies act as intermediaries between physicians 
and Norwegian health care institutions. 
mostly forbidden until it was legalized in 200022. 
From 2003 private companies can unfetteredly act as 
intermediaries and rent out labour of any type. 
2.16 From 1998, the government has had action plans 
directed towards securing the future recruitment of 
health personnel23. SHDir is now responsible for the 
planning of education capacity and recruitment 
policies for health personnel. On commission from 
SHDir, SSB has made two similar reports with 
estimates of future supply and demand of health 
personnel (Stølen et al. (2002) and Texmon and 
Stølen (2005)). I present the latter in paragraph 3.14. 
2.17 Buhaug (1997) evaluates the agreement based 
regulation of the physicians market (see paragraph 
2.4), and concludes that it was ineffective. (See 
paragraph 3.1 for a further presentation of the 
evaluation.) In 1999 it was replaced by legislative 
regulation, which is still in effect. Under the 1999 law 
all government-financed physician positions require 
a permit from HD. A council named the National 
Council for Position Structure and Physician 
Distribution (Nasjonalt råd for spesialistutdanning 
og legefordeling) was established to process 
applications for new physician positions on behalf of 
HD. The ‘position structure’ part of the council's 
name refer to its responsibilities in governing the 
physician specialist position education structure, 
which is a topic I will not look further into. This 
council’s composition is similar to the composition of 
the council mentioned in paragraph 2.4, which had 
the same function under the former agreement based 
regulation.24 
2.18 In 2000 the Parliament decided to change the 
immigration policy to make it easier for foreigners 
from non-EEA countries to seek employment in 
Norway. The health service’s need for labor was a 
                                                                 
22 The legal change in 2000 was based on the green paper NOU 
1998:15 “Arbeidsformidling og arbeidsleie. (Blaalid-utvalgets 
rapport)”. Case number 1430310 in the archives at 
www.odin.dep.no. 
23 The latest is from 2002, and available from SHDir in print and 
electronically: “Rekrutteringsplan for helse- og sosialpersonell 2003-
2006: Rekruttering for betre kvalitet”, SHDir november 2002. 
24 The source for this paragraph is “Nasjonalt råd for 
spesialistutdanning av leger og legefordeling: Årsmelding 2000” 
which I aquired from SHDir. 
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consideration behind the change25. 
2.19 In 2001 the list patient reform (FLO) was 
introduced26. The core aspect of FLO was to 
strengthen the bond between physician and patient 
by assigning each patient to one particular GP 
through a patient list system. FLO established clearer 
areas of responsibilities for GPs and municipalities. 
The GPs became responsible for providing the 
patients on their list with physician services within 
office hours through the entire year. 
2.20 Under FLO, municipalities are legally obliged to 
provide all inhabitants with a spot on a GP’s list. 
They should also have at least two GPs with non-full 
patient lists, in order to give patients a real choice 
between different GPs. Each GP can specify the 
maximum number of patients on her or his list. FLO 
consequently impose a minimum standard for 
physician density which municipalities should 
comply to. 
After the introduction of FLO, GPs receive a fixed 
amount of money per patient on their list from the 
municipality, FFS payments from RTV and some 
modest user payments. 30% of the total salary is 
supposed to come from the per capita part, and 70% 
as FFS payments from RTV and patients. 
2.21 Some small and rural municipalities still have 
GPs as employees, but that type of relation between 
GP and municipality has become less common after 
FLO was introduced. 
2.22 All GPs with private practices without 
government contracts were offered contracts within 
the FLO system, and most of them accepted. This is 
similar to what happened with private practice 
specialists in 1998. After the introduction of FLO, no 
physician with private practice in Norway receive 
FFS payments from RTV unless they have a contract 
with the government. 
                                                                 
25 Innst.S. nr. 117 (1999-2000) "Regulering av arbeidsinnvandring.". 
Case number 1440134 in the archives at www.odin.dep.no. 
26 St meld nr 23 (1996-97) ”Trygghet og ansvarlighet Om 
legetjenesten i kommunene og fastlegeordningen.” Case number 
1410228 in the archives at www.odin.dep.no. 
2.23 GPs got a significant increase in their salary 
following the introduction of FLO. Lacking reliable 
data on physician salaries, I refer to a newspaper in 
Bergen, a municipality with approximately 230 000 
inhabitants. The newspaper checked income 
statement reports on GPs for 2000 and 200127. 
According to their calculations, GPs participating in 
FLO on average increased their before-tax income 
with NOK 90 000 from 2001 to 2002. FLO was 
introduced July 1st 2001, thus the figures from the 
newspaper indicate an increase in average annual 
salary directly after the reform in the vicinity of NOK 
180 000. A GP quoted in Carlsen, B (2005) mentions 
NOK 210 000 as his salary increase with FLO. 
2.24 The 1st of January 2002, ownership of the 
specialist health service, chiefly hospitals, was 
transferred from the 19 counties to the central 
government. 
2.25 According to a newspaper report referring to 
SSB data, the average salary for physicians in 
hospitals increased with NOK 85 000 from 2002 to 
2003, and almost doubled from 1994 to 200428. 
Another newspaper article refers to the negotiation 
results between DNLF and the employers’ 
organisation, and writes that the increase in salary 
for hospital physicians from 2002 to 2003 was 20%29. 
2.26 Since 2004 it has become easier for physicians 
from the new EU countries in Eastern Europe to 
enter the Norwegian labor market. Eventually 
physicians with recent medical degrees from the new 
EU countries will be flowing just as freely as people 
from the old EEA member countries are doing30. 
2.27 Hunskår and Røttingen (2004) discuss the lack 
of research oriented institutions in the GP area in 
Norway. In 2006 the Parliament set aside three 
millions to plan for research institutions dedicated to 
general practice related topics31. 
                                                                 
27 Bergens Tidende October 11 2003 “Fikk 140.000 i lønnsøkning”. 
28 Dagens Næringsliv July 22 2005 “Legelønn nær doblet på ti år”. 
29 Dagsavisen March 22 2004 “Nesten 100 000 mer til legene”. 
30 Source: http://www.safh.no/saksgang/informasjon-eu.htm. 
31 ”Forskning i allmennmedisin” TDNLF no. 12 2006 (volume 126) 
page 1647. 
 16 
2.28 By august 2006 it was evident that hospitals 
have employed more physicians than permitted by 
HD, under the legal regulation of the physician 
market established in 199932 (see paragraph 2.17). 
Figure 1 is an overview over this chapter. I would 
like to point out the major development trends. 
2.29 The beginning of the 1990s saw a reversal of the 
policy from the 80s of reducing the number of 
medical students, domestically and abroad. By 1997 
the government was buying education capacity at 
foreign universities, and was also recruiting 
physicians directly from abroad. From 1998 the 
government has had an explicit policy for planning 
the future supply and demand for health personnel. 
In chapter 4 I discuss how the recruitment situation 
in rural areas is likely to be affected by the aggregate 
level of supply and demand of physicians. 
2.30 Immigration and labor market regulations have 
been liberalized. In the 1980s, private companies 
could not act as intermediaries between employee 
and employers in the labor market. After 2003 such 
activities are not restricted by any regulations. Any 
non-Nordic physician that wished to relocate to 
Norway prior to the EEA agreement would have 
faced difficulties in getting a work permit. After the 
immigration law liberalization in 2001, it is possible 
for physicians (and other professionals in demand) 
to move to Norway and work here regardless of their 
country of origin. With the EU enlargement, 
physicians from the 25 EU countries (plus 
Switzerland33 and EEA-members Liechtenstein and 
Iceland) are able to move freely to Norway and 
obtain Norwegian physician authorizations and 
work permits relatively easily. Foreign physicians 
have since 1992 played an increasingly important 
role in the Norwegian health care system, 
particularly in rural areas. I will discuss this further 
in chapter 5. 
                                                                 
32 Dagens Medisin August 17 2006 “Ansetter årlig 200 leger 
ulovlig”. 
33 Source on Swiss physicians - quote from SAFH’s web page 
http://www.safh.no/regelverk/eos.html (as per september 2006): 
“Personer med utdanning eller autorisasjon/ lisens fra Sveits har 
samme rettigheter som EØS-borgere fra 2002, i henhold til "avtale 
med tilhørende vedlegg om endring av Konvensjon om opprettelse 
av Det europeiske frihandelsforbund (EFTA) av 4. januar 1960, 
undertegnet i Vaduz 21. juni 2001", se St.prp. nr. 10 (2001-2002) om 
ratifisering for Norge.” 
2.31 The development in regulations regarding 
publicly financed physician positions has gone in the 
opposite direction – towards being more restrictive 
and involving more government control. Physicians 
and other healthcare professionals have always been 
allowed to run privately financed health services in 
Norway. What has changed is to what extent these 
receive government funding. Prior to 1992 any 
physician could establish a private practice and 
receive FFS payments. After 2001, with the 
introduction of FLO, only physicians with a 
government contract are eligible for the FFS funding. 
This change limits the number of physicians in 
central parts of the country by imposing greater 
government control over the public money flow to 
physicians.  
2.32 From 1984 to 1988 the demand side of the 
physician market was unregulated, and all hospitals 
and municipalities could unfetteredly hire 
physicians. There was an agreement based 
regulation of demand for physicians in effect from 
1989 to 1998 – which was not effective (see 
paragraph 2.17). Since 1999 the government has in 
principle (but not in practice – see paragraph 2.28) 
been in complete control of the entire publicly 
financed physician market, as any new physician 
position within the public health service now require 
a permit from HD. The regulation of physician 
positions is meant to be a tool for the government for 
improving the recruitment situation in rural areas. 
2.33 From 1988 to 1989 there was a law in effect that 
permitted the government to forcibly order 
physicians to specific positions. I have not read 
anywhere about these powers actually being used. 
Similar measures have been suggested by politicians 
and others at several occations34. 
2.34 All domestically educated physicians, and to a 
various extent physicians educated abroad, are 
required to take the intern duty service prior to 
receiving their Norwegian physician authorization. 
This includes six months in general practice. 
Traditionally the GP intern service has been 
extensively used to supply physicians to 
municipalities with recruitment problems. The  
                                                                 
34 See for example “ Nei til plikttjeneste i samiske strøk” TDNLF no. 
1 2005 (volume 126) page 125. 
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 interns can only state preferences regarding at what 
location they wish to have this practice – ultimately 
they are required to go where assigned.  
2.35 During the years from 1996 to 1998 physicians 
working at hospitals received large salary increases. 
GPs got a jump in salary when FLO was introduced 
in 2001. Hospital physicians seem to have received a 
jump in salary again around 2002. As I discuss under 
paragraph 4.4, the recruitment situation in the 
primary health service can be affected by the relative 
salary between the primary and specialist health 
service. The salary increases in the hospitals coincide 
with reforms in the hospital sector. This may or may 
not be coincidental, but it is outside the scope of this 
thesis to discuss that question. 
2.36 One area that I have chosen not to refer to in 
detail, are measures specifically addressing 
recruitment problems faced by rural municipalities. 
The government has in the time period covered to an 
increasing extent used such policy measures. 
Examples are the establishment of a telemedicine 
center35 in 1993, the focus on establishing larger 
health care units in the municipalities to generate 
stronger professional environments for health 
personnel36, and initiatives taken to promote inter-
municipality cooperation in emergency physician 
services in order to reduce the workload on 
physicians outside office hours37. 
In this chapter I have presented the most important 
institutional and political developments affecting the 
geographical distribution of physicians since the 
1980s: The education capacity was reduced in the 
1980s and increased in the 1990s. Immigration and 
labor market regulations have been liberalized since 
the mid-1990s. Physician positions have, atleast 
partly in futility, been attempted regulated since 
1989 and more strictly since 1999. The public funding 
for GPs have become put under stricter control. The 
relative salary between GPs and hospital physicians 
                                                                 
35 The Norwegian Centre for Telemedicine at the University 
Hospital in Tromsø, which is also a WHO collaboration center. Web 
site: www.telemed.no. 
36 See for example "Distriktsmedisin - ny giv for allmennleger i 
Utkant-Norge" by Tom Sundar. TDNLF no. 2 2002 (volume 122) 
page 221. 
37 See for example ”Vil ha økt vekt på interkommunal legevakt” 
TDNLF no. 13-14 2006 page 126. 
has been in development. Policy measures targeted 
at rural areas has to an increasing extent been used. 
Chapter 3: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Here I present selected literature that is suitable for 
shedding light over the aspects of the Norwegian 
physician market related to the geographical 
distribution of physicians and how the government 
has tried to achieve its targets on that area.  
 3.1 Buhaug (1997) is the only study I have found of 
the regulation of physician positions, which has been 
an important part of the Norwegian physician 
market policy (although more intentionally than 
effectively). Buhaug (1997) evaluates the agreement-
based regulation of the physician market that lasted 
from 1989 to 1999 (see paragraph 2.4). The agreement 
was renegotiated in 1995, and merged with a similar 
agreement that had as purpose to regulate positions 
related to the education in the different physician 
specialities. The motivation for the merge was 
mainly practical, to get one administration concerned 
with physician positions instead of two. 
Under the agreement a council38 with representatives 
from the agreement partners (KS, DNLF, HD and the 
municipality of Oslo) processed applications from 
hospitals or municipalities for new physician 
positions. The council had a small secretariat that 
were also supposed to keep track of all physician 
positions. Buhaug (1997) writes that the 
administration did not have the necessary resources 
to monitor the physician market as intended. His 
impression, after informal conversations and a 
rudimentary survey of health managers at county 
level (the counties owned most hospitals at that 
time), was that the agreement was not taken 
seriously. The health managers expressed low 
confidence in and little loyalty to the regulation 
                                                                 
38 From 1989 to 1995 the council was called 
”Legefordelingsutvalget”, abbreviated LFU. In English, ”The 
physician distribution council”. With the renegotiation in 1995 the 
council changed name to ”Utvalg for legestillinger og 
stillingsstruktur”, abbreviated ULS. In English, ”Council for 
physician positions and position structure.” (Buhaug (1997)) 
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regime. Buhaug (1997) compares figures on 
physicians from the council’s secretariat to work year 
data from SSB, and shows that there was 
substantially larger growth in the number of actually 
employed physicians than what the growth in 
permits given from the physician distribution 
council implied. His conclusion is that the regulation 
was not effective, because the agreement partners 
commonly ignored the agreement and employed 
physicians without having the required permits from 
the council. 
Buhaug (1997) is important because he documents 
that one of the chief political instruments used to 
promote equity in the geographical distribution of 
physicians from 1989 to 1998, the agreement-based 
regulation of the physician market, failed to 
accomplish its goals. 
3.2 Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) is a qualitative study of 
the physician shortage situation in one county (Møre 
og Romsdal). The report was made on commission 
from KS. Their primary source is interviews with 
physicians and health managers at hospitals and in 
the municipality health service. 
Some of their findings are: When recruiting 
physicians, employment opportunities for spouses as 
well as kindergarten and schooling facilities could be 
important factors. Interns were an important 
resource in municipalities with recruitment 
problems. Many municipalities had particular 
problems with recruiting physicians to physician 
positions with administrative or community 
medicine duties. The chief physicians in the 
municipalities carried larger responsibilities and 
earned less than regular GPs with FFS contracts 
commonly did. 
Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) emphasize the importance 
stability of physicians had in the municipality health 
service. Physicians in long-term employment made it 
possible to develop more profesionally interesting 
work environments. Municipalities that had 
succeeded in creating such work environments for 
their physicians could more easily recruit new 
physicians. Municipalities with an unstable 
physician workforce typically had a professionally 
less interesting work environment, making 
recruitment harder. 
3.3 The use of short-term substitutes, often 
foreigners, were by the municipalities viewed as a 
last-resort solution to fulfill their obligation to 
provide their inhabitants with physician services. 
According to Kjekshus and Tjora (1998), short term 
GP substitutes were usually more monetarily 
motivated than GPs staying in their positions for 
longer durations. The remuneration scheme for 
emergency physician services at the time of the study 
consisted of FFS payments going directly from RTV 
into the physician’s pocket. (This was changed to a 
per-hour salary system in 2000.) Given the incentives 
provided to them with the FFS system, physicians on 
short-term contracts would commonly work as much 
as possible, also outside the normal office hours. This 
could over time make the patient population get 
used to being able to see the doctor at evenings and 
nights even when swift consultations were not 
medically required. Municipalities with a history of 
using short-term substitutes as GPs, would typically 
have a patients that expecting GPs to respond at any 
time during the day - or night. This increased the 
recruitment difficulties, since physicians looking for 
long-term employment were less inclined to 
appreciate work calls at evenings and nights. 
Municipalities with a stable GP workforce could 
teach their patients to seek treatment during office 
hours, and in that way reduce the work load at 
evenings and nights. This would make recruiting 
GPs easier and increase the stability of the GPs in the 
municipality. 
3.4 Thus Kjekshus and Tjora found two mechanisms 
that potentially can create self-reinforcing spirals in 
the GP recruitment conditions in municipalities: A 
history of unstable physicians and use of short term 
substitutes can lead to a weak professional work 
environment, and high work load outside office 
hours. This will again contribute to recruitment 
difficulties. Conversely a municipality that have had 
stable GPs for some time, may have a more 
interesting professional work environment and less 
workload on evenings, weekends and nights – 
making it easier to recruit new GPs. 
Cooperation between municipalities on emergency 
physician services may make recruitment easier by 
contributing to reducing the workload on GPs 
outside office hours by having one GP cover more 
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than one municipality while on duty. The study 
points out that in the political landscape of rural 
municipalities such arrangements can be interpreted 
as a step toward centralization, and therefore be 
viewed as undesirable by the political leadership. 
3.5 Kjekshus and Tjora also discuss possible 
explanations for the physician shortage as it can be 
observed in terms of unoccupied positions. They 
write that there are additional explanations behind 
the vacant positions to what they call traditional 
physician shortage, caused by lack of physicians 
willing to accept positions. Overtime can be an 
important source of income for some physicians, 
which may make them less interested in having all 
positions filled. Positions may also be held vacant in 
order to have the necessary flexibility to recruit 
promising candidates, if any should turn up. 
3.6 A very important conclusion from Kjekshus and 
Tjora (1998) is that quantitative data on the number 
of work years for physicians have poor validity 
particularly for municipalities with recruitment 
problems. A large number of observed work years 
does not necessarily imply that the patients in that 
municipality receives high quality GP services. On 
the contrary, it can mean that the municipality have 
a history of unstable physicians and of being reliant 
on short term substitutes. Because of discontinuity in 
the GP-patient relations and excessive workload 
from emergency GP services, such municipalities can 
in fact have an expensive, ineffective and low quality 
GP health service. 
Thus Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) de-validifies the use 
of GP work years to measure GP service quality for 
rural municipalities. I discuss this issue further in 
chapter 5. The other important message from 
Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) is the importance of 
stability in the GP population for having an effective 
high-quality GP service 
3.7 Abelsen and Bæck (2005) is a report 
commissioned by HD as part of the evaluation of 
FLO. They look at challenges related to GP stability 
in the municipality health service in two rural 
counties, Finnmark and Nord-Trøndelag, in 
conjunction with the list patient reform. They start 
with discretionarily constructing a dichotomous 
indicator variable for physician stability, based on 
data from RTV on patient lists. They point out that 
there were no abolute pattern between municipalities 
classified as stable or unstable in for example 
demographics and rurality. Their primary 
information source is surveys of health managers, 
physicians and patients. They find that 
municipalities with unstable GPs have lower 
proximity to specialist health service resources than 
municipalities with stable physicians. Workload 
from emergency physician services are higher in 
municipalities with unstable physicians. 
Municipalities with unstable physicians have longer 
patient lists, and they have more physicians on 
regular fixed salary employment than municipalities 
with stable physicians. 
Abelsen and Bæck (2005) end up attributing much of 
the difference in physician stability between 
municipalities to local organizational differences. 
They write that the most important reason for 
wanting to quit stated by GPs in municipalities with 
instability in the GP work force was the lack of a 
climate of cooperation between the GPs and the 
municipality leadership. The authors are 
inconclusive concerning the direction of causality on 
that matter. Abelsen and Bæck (2005) leave the 
impression that administrative craftsmanship in the 
municipality administration is of importance for the 
physician recruitment situation in the municipality 
health service. 
Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) and Abelsen and Bæck 
(2005) are two major studies using several different 
data collection methods, with an overall qualitative 
focus. I have presented them here mainly because 
they provide valuable contextual information on the 
challenges regarding physician distribution. Both 
underpin the importance of stability as opposed to 
raw physician work year density. They also 
document the relation between vacancies and 
instability. Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) is important for 
the empirical chapter for their discussion of the 
validity of work year data. 
The next two references I present are less extensive 
more quantitative studies. They also adress the 
situation in rural municipalities, using survey data. 
3.8 Grytten et al. (1999) use data from a survey of 
GPs in 1998. They try to find factors related to what 
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extent GPs plan to relocate. Considerations to the 
family regarding work load and choice of place of 
residence were most important. Factors related to 
possibilities for professional development and 
autonomy were also important. 
3.9 Andersen et al. (2001) is based on data from a 
survey of chief physicians in municipalities in 
Northern Norway in 1999. They report that 
professional isolation and workload from emergency 
physician services contributie negatively to the 
stability of GPs. The authors write that inter-
municipality cooperation can provide solutions that 
address both of these factors. 
3.10 I have chosen not to go into detail regarding 
what municipalities and the central government can 
do to make physician positions in rural 
municipalities more attractive. What is important is 
that the government has an action space when it 
comes to shaping rural GP positions into becoming 
more attractive for physicians. This is illustrated by 
the two latter references and the references given in 
paragraph 2.36. This notion is of importance to the 
discussion in chapter 4. 
3.11 With the introduction of  FLO, funding for 
research to evaluate the reform was included in the 
budgets. FLO has been thoroughly evaluated. I 
present some studies that compares the situation 
before and after the introduction of FLO. 
3.12 Sørensen og Grytten (2003) look at differences in 
productivity between GPs on FFS contracts and GPs 
employed directly by municipalities. The following 
quote is from the abstract: 
“We find that physicians with a fee-for-service contract 
produce a higher number of consultations and other 
patient contacts than physicians with a fixed salary. This 
difference is mostly due to longer working hours, but time 
efficiency is greater as well. Moreover, a part of the 
difference is due to a selection effect: salaried physicians 
prefer shorter working hours and prefer to work less 
intensively. When these and other effects are taken into 
account, we find that a change from a salary contract to a 
fee-for-service contract will increase service production by 
20-40%.” 
After the introduction of FLO, the number of GPs on 
fixed salary employment has been reduced (see 
paragraph 2.21). GPs on fixed salary contracts have 
been most common in rural and small municipalities. 
The result quoted above might imply that 
productivity in the GP service in many rural 
municipalities increased with the introduction of 
FLO because of the changed incentives in the GP 
work contracts. In the empirical chapter I discuss the 
possibilty that this effect may have contributed to 
reduced growth rate in physician work years in rural 
municipalities after 2001, when FLO was introduced. 
3.13 Carlsen (2003) is based on group interviews with 
GPs subsequent to the introduction of FLO. 59 of the 
81 informants were positive to FLO. Higher 
continuity in the patient-GP relation and higher 
salary were popular consequences of FLO among the 
GPs. The increased responsibility for the patients on 
their lists were by some seen as negative. Based on 
the same interviews, Carlsen, B (2005) mentions 
informants that emphasized the possibilities under 
FLO to limit their patient lists, in order to be able to 
focus on a smaller number of patients. An 
interpretation could be that FLO gave GPs more 
control of their work situation, through the patient 
list mechanism, and that this have contributed to an 
increase in GPs satisfaction with their job after the 
introduction of FLO. Both reports indicate that FLO 
increased the overall attractiveness of GP positions. 
This is likely to have lead to increased  stability of 
GPs in general. 
3.14 HELSEMOD is a model framework developed 
by SSB for estimating future supply and demand for 
health personnel. Two reports with  HELSEMOD-
estimates have been published – Stølen et al. (2002) 
and Texmon and Stølen (2005). The reports are quite 
similar, the biggest difference being the time period 
covered. In the discussion below I only refer to the 
2005 report. The authors emphazise that the figures 
they provide should not be interpreted as prognoses, 
but rather calculations of what may happen if certain 
assumptions are met.  
Some of the assumptions behind the supply-side in 
the model are: 
• a constant number of Norwegian medical 
students abroad 
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• a constant number of foreign physicians in 
Norway 
• constant mix between the different health 
professions in the work force 
• constant completion rate among medical 
students, abroad (80%) and domestically (97%) 
• balance between supply and demand in the base 
year, 2004. 
They have 4 different scenarios for the demand side, 
with growth in health expenditures based on 
population growth as the first scenario, and three 
others with 1.5%, 2 %, and 2,5% growth. The 
assumption regarding expected annual GNP growth 
behind the calculations is 2%. They take into account 
future changes in the demographical structure. Table 
2 shows key figures from their calculations. 
Table 2 HELSEMOD: Future scenarios for supply 
and demand for physicians (from Texmon and 
Stølen (2005)). 
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2 020 25062 4059 1441 -501 -2593 
2 025 26371 4297 1397 -1333 -4346 
In the theory chapter I argue that securing an 
adequate supply of physicians should be a central 
element of the government’s physician market 
policy. The HELSEMOD estimates is SHDir’s main 
instrument in their planning of health personnel 
education and recruitment policies. In the final 
chapter I discuss to what extent the HELSEMOD-
estimates are suitable for that purpose. 
The next three references I present discuss the 
geographical distribion of GPs in Norway. They are 
conserned with equity directly and compare the 
distribution of GPs or reported satisfaction with the 
GP service to variables indicating need or health 
status. 
3.15 Elstad (1991) attempts to find explanations for 
inequalities in the use of GP services. He uses data 
from 1985 to 1989. He finds that variables related to 
socio-economic deprivation (specifically divorce rate, 
share of workers employed in industry and average 
taxable income), GP density and location in northern 
Norway contribute positively to the use of GP 
services -- while location in Western Norway, Oslo 
and cities in general contribute to lower use of GP 
services. He discusses the trend with increased 
demand for GP services. He suggests that supplier-
induced demand, increased need for GP services or 
behavioral changes in the patient population may be 
feasible causes behind the growing demand for GP 
services. 
3.16 Grytten et al. (1995) use individual level data 
from SSB’s 1985 national health survey. These cross-
section surveys take place every decade and have 
around 10 000 respondents. The authors combine 
survey data on GP visits with municipality 
characteristics. They find little correspondence 
between variables indicating acces to GPs (e.g. GP 
density, travel time and income) and use of GP 
services. They conclude that GP services are to a 
considerable degree equitably distributed in 
Norway. 
3.17 The authors of Grytten et al. (1995) are behind 
Sørensen et al. (1997), where they also use the same 
data. Here they develop a microeconomic decision-
based model of municipality and individual 
behavior. They conclude that “a decentralized system of 
primary physician services does seem to be fairly effective 
in securing equity in access to services for the municipal 
population. Local governments do take the healthcare 
needs of their inhabitants into account when deciding on 
the level of supply, and variation in revenue between the 
municipalities does not lead to any major inequalities in 
supply of physicians.” 
3.18 Carlsen (2006) uses data on self assessed health 
from a survey with 75 000 respondents aged 40 to 42 
that took place between 1995 and 1999. He combines 
this with data on satisfaction with the GP service 
from other surveys, also with 5-digit number of 
respondents, carried out in the years 1998-2000 and  
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2003-2004. He controls for individual specific 
variance in the variable for reported satisfaction. His 
conclusion is that there is a clear positive relationship 
between the population health status and quality of 
the GP health service, and that this relationship was 
reduced somewhat from the period 1998-2000 to the 
period 2003-2004. He relates the reduction to the 
introduction of the list patient reform. Similar to in 
Carlsen, F (2005) he finds that variables associated 
with recruitment problems (GP turnover, GPs on 
fixed salary) are negatively correlated with 
population health status. I quote from his conclusion: 
”When satisfaction with the GP service as reported by the 
inhabitants is used as indicator of the quality of the GP 
service, I find that the GP service is distributed in favor 
municipalities were the population is in good health.” ... 
“Geographical variations in the recruitment situation for 
GPs and the size of the GP market [ie municipality size] 
contribute to the skewness in the quality of GP treatment. 
Variations in turnover also contribute to a distribution in 
accessibility to GPs in favor of areas where the population 
is in healthy.”39. 
The articles mentioned in paragraphs 3.15 to 3.17 all 
use data from the 1980s, while Carlsen (2006) uses 
relatively fresh data. An important advantage of the 
method Carlsen (2006) uses, is that he does not 
operationalize GP service quality to the number of 
GP-patient contacts or GP work years. By using 
reported satisfaction with GP services he can capture 
variation in quality that originates in recruitment 
problems, as for example low stability and 
communication problems with foreign physicians. 
These studies of the geographical distribution of GPs 
ask whether differences in GP density are a source of 
inequity or not. That question is of great importance 
for how the physician market policy should be. Of 
the three studies Carlsen (2006) is by far the most 
comprehensive study, and he concludes that GPs are 
not equitably distributed. Thus it seems apparent 
that the physician market policy should be 
                                                                 
39 Original Norwegian text: “Når befolkningens oppfatning av 
allmennlegetjenesten brukes som mål på allmennlegetilbudet, finner 
jeg at tilbudet er skjevfordelt i favør av kommuner der befolkningen 
har god helse.” ...”Geografiske variasjoner i rekrutteringssituasjonen 
for fastleger og størrelsen på fastlegemarkedet bidrar til at kvaliteten 
på allmennlegenes behandling av pasientene er skjevt fordelt. 
Variasjoner i turnover bidrar også til at tilgjengeligheten er 
skjevfordelt i favør av områder der befolkningen har god helse” 
concerned with the distribution of GPs in order to 
promote equity and social justice. 
3.19 Van Doorslaer and Masseria (2004) include 
measures on inequality in the use of GP services in 
Norway and 20 other OECD countries. They 
decompose the inequality indices to relate it to 
different factors as need, geography and socio-
economic status. This study underpins the existence 
of inequity related to distribution of health services 
in Norway. 
3.20 Rechel et al. (2006) discuss the health personnel 
policies of 10 European countries including Norway 
in a broad perspective40. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to discuss Norwegian physician market 
policies in an international context. 
Figure 2 is an overview of the literature chapter. 
Chapter 4: THEORETICAL 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a 
theoretical framework for the physician market, and 
use it to analyze policy measures the government 
can use to reach its policy goals. I choose not to call it 
a model since models in the social science of 
economics are usually clearer defined and more 
mathematically elaborate than what I present here. 
Physicians enter the labor market seeking 
employment. They will look for the positions that 
can give them highest utility and apply for them. As 
well as physicians seeking employment, there are 
employers seeking physicians. Employers have 
physician positions with specific characteristics that 
physicians evaluate – they enter the physicians’ 
utility function. What determines the utility 
physicians get from different positions? 
                                                                 
40 The chapter on Norway in Rechel et al. (2006) is written by the 
same author as this thesis. 
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4.1 Here are some examples of factors that are 
important for physicians when they evaluate 
available positions:  
• Physicians will prefer earning more money 
compared to less, everything else being equal. 
Physicians will work more given higher 
marginal salary (see for example Baltagi et al. 
2003). 
• Having the opportunity to work overtime may 
contribute positive to physicians’ utility (see 
paragraph 3.5). 
• Professional isolation and work load from work 
outside office hours may contribute negatively 
to utility (see under paragraphs 3.2, 3.7, 3.8 and 
3.9). 
• Physicians can have preferences for different 
types of work contract (see for example Scott 
(2000), p. 1190: "Payment systems are major 
determinants of professional job satisfaction and 
morale, and can therefore influence supply and labor 
market behavior.”) 
Grytten et al. (1999) gives an overview of various 
perspectives in economic theory of what type of 
preferences physicians may have. I will assume that 
the preferences can be different between physicians: 
Some may prefer GP positions over hospital 
positions and others may even prefer to have 
positions in  rural municipalities deemed as 
unattractive by most physicians. 
Let the attributes of a physician position that enters 
the physicians’ utility function be x1, x2, . . . , xn. This 
can be defined as a vector x. Each individual 
physician has a utility function into which x enters, 
u(x). I define the attractiveness of a position to be a 
function of x denominated A or A(x). The 
attractiveness describes how much utility physicians 
in general, on an aggregate level, receives from a 
position with the specified x attribute vector. 
4.2 Given individual differences in position 
preferences (u(-)) between physicians, positions that 
are generally unattractive (low A) will have fewer 
physicians applying to them than more attractive 
positions (high A). Because physicians are 
individuals with different preferences, there will be 
physicians that prefer to work in positions that most 
other physicians find unattractive. The less attractive 
the position is, the fewer physicians will prefer to 
work there. 
Without individual differences between physicians 
(and with zero cost of changing positions for 
physicians), the most unattractive positions will 
always be vacant, and the m most attractive 
positions, where  m = the total number of physicians, 
will always be occupied. This is not what can be 
observed for physician positions in the primary 
health service. All municipalities have GPs 
employed, though with varying vacancy rates, as I 
show in the empirical chapter. But there might be 
physician positions outside the municipality health 
service that are so unattractive that they, given the 
current and historical levels of supply in the 
physician market, have had no applicants or even 
available positions, for example in the market for 
privately financed health services. 
Since municipalities with unattractive GP positions 
have higher vacancy rates than municipalities with 
attractive GP positions and since the affected 
municipalities tends to be in rural areas, as I show in 
the empirical chapter, or have a population with low 
health status, as Carlsen (2006) finds (see paragraph 
3.13) – if there are too few physicians for all GP 
positions to have applicants, there will be inequity. 
Such inequity will exist until the supply of 
physicians is sufficiently high for the physician 
market to be saturated to such an extent that so 
many physicians find employment in rural and 
deprivated municipalities more attractive than other 
employment opportunities, that all GP positions are 
occupied (to the extent possible given the normal 
friction in the labor market). 
Thus an important policy tool for the government in 
its physician market policy should be to make sure 
an adequate number of physicians is available for 
employment. If there are fewer physicians than GP 
positions, there will be vacancies. Those vacancies 
will be predominantly in the least attractive 
positions. If the physician supply is increased, 
eventually some physicians that prefer attractive 
positions in central areas will be forced to accept 
employment in unattractive position in rural areas, 
since there will be more physicians seeking attractive 
positions than available. A different mechanism with 
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similar effect is that increasing the supply of 
physicians will (not unconditionally, see paragraph 
4.3) also increase the number of physicians of the 
type that prefers to work in more unattractive 
positions, and in that way reduce the number of 
vacant unattractive positions and the level of 
inequity directly.  
Most likely the number of physician positions 
available in the market, also as vacant positions, is 
dependant on the number of physicians available for 
employment. Based on common economical sense, it 
should be safe to assume that the price elasticity of 
demand for physicians is likely to be higher in the 
long run than in the short run. In addition, there are 
probably employment opportunities already in 
existence for physicians in the market for privately 
financed health services that are so unattractive that 
they do not show up as unoccupied in any statistics, 
that may absorb physicians if the supply were to 
increase. Hence, if the government should desire to 
eliminate all vacancies, it will be necessary to 
increase the supply of physicians beyond the 
currently observed level of demand for physicians. 
Above I argue that increased supply of physicians is 
a vital policy instrument for the government for 
combating inequity in the distribution of GP services. 
Below I continue with expanding the theoretical 
framework. 
The physician market is dynamic over time: New 
positions are being added to the market, both 
attractive and unattractive ones, because of growing 
demand. Old physicians retire and freshly educated 
physicians (or immigrant physicians) enter the 
market. Physicians relocate and switch jobs, also due 
to causes not related to the positions themselves, 
such as family considerations. I assume changing 
jobs impose a cost in the form of a loss of utility for 
physicians, mainly based on the rationale that 
abandoning a social setting often involves a loss. 
This cost is likely to increase over time, as people 
tend to get more settled when they live at the same 
location for a long period of time. I also assume that 
employers prefer physicians with work experience. It 
could be interesting to differentiate physicians 
according to skill level or quality as well, but I will 
leave that factor out in order to keep it simple. 
New attractive positions will be applied to by 
physicians that are new on the market. In addition, 
physicians in existing unattractive positions will 
apply for the new position and wish to relocate, if 
the difference in the future discounted utility flows 
of their existing position and the new position make 
up for the relocation cost. What will happen, given 
the existence of moderate relocation costs, is that 
experienced physicians will get the attractive 
positions, and the new inexperienced physicians will 
be left with the unattractive positions. The higher the 
difference between physician positions in terms of 
attractiveness is, the less important the relocation 
costs will be, and the more likely it is that physicians 
in the unattractive positions will try to relocate when 
they get the opportunity. 
This implies that differences in attractiveness 
between physician positions are a source for 
inequitable instability, and therefore a political 
problem that the government should adress with 
their physician market policy, as discussed in the 
introduction. Rural municipalities with unattractive 
positions get inexperienced physicians that will tend 
to move away when they have enough experience to 
get more attractive positions in more central parts of 
the country. How can the government remedy this? 
In paragraph 4.2 I wrote about the effect of increased 
supply of physicians: Increasing the supply of 
physicians may increase the number of physicians of 
the type that prefers to work in more unattractive 
positions. These will not try to relocate, but stay in 
their jobs. Thus in addition to leading to a reduction 
in the vacancy rate, increased supply of physicians is 
likely to also increase the stability in areas with 
unattractive physician positions, thereby promoting 
equity. 
The government can also force physicians to take 
specific positions, as is done with interns (see 
paragraph 2.34), or by commanding physicians (as 
discussed in paragraph 2.33). It should be safe to 
assume that involuntarily labor will have low 
stability, since most of the concerned physicians will 
look for an attractive job elsewhere when the forced 
period is up in order to get higher utility. But the 
policy used when distributing interns have an effect - 
Sørensen et al. (1997) writes that “central policies in the 
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distribution of junior physicians are effective in equalizing 
supply [of physicians] among municipalities” (p. 715). 
4.3 A better measure can be to educate more 
physicians at the medical schools located closer to 
the municipalities with recruitment problems. I 
quote the conclusion from Alexandersen et al. (2004): 
“The University of Tromsø is still important in recruiting 
doctors to the northern regions of Norway, primarily 
because this university educates students who come from 
these regions.”  That conclusion is an argument for 
educating physicians as far away from Oslo as 
possible. 
4.4 Below I discuss a different set of policy measures 
– policies targeted at changing the attractiveness of 
positions by changing the attributes, the x-vector, of 
the physician positions. Not all factors x consists of 
are easy or even possible to change – but some are 
(see paragraph 3.10). It is the relative attractiveness 
between the different positions available for 
physicians that matters. There are policies that make 
GP positions in rural areas more attractive by 
reducing the availability (or even attractiveness) of 
positions in other segments of the physician market. 
The policies intended to regulate the number of 
physician positions referred to in paragraph 2.32 fit 
this description. The salary increases in the specialist 
health service referred to in paragraph 2.23 and 2.25 
may have reduced the relative attractiveness of GP 
positions, by making positions in hospitals more 
absolutely attractive. 
Paragraph 2.36 and the paragraphs pointed to in 
paragraph 4.1 contains information about policy 
measures targeted at improving the physician 
recruitment situation in rural municipalities – policy 
measures that within this theoretical framework can 
be understood as having effect through changing x. 
Most of what I mention in those paragraphs concerns 
municipal policies – the central government enters as 
accommodator. I have chosen not to go into further 
into this area in order to keep the scope limited. 
With relocation costs physicians will only move if 
their utility gain exceeds the relocation cost. If the 
difference in attractiveness between positions 
decrease the utility gain from relocating decreases, 
and it becomes more likely that physicians will stay 
in their positions. Thus given the presence of 
relocation costs increasing the attractiveness of 
unattractive positions will increase the stability of 
the physicians in less attractive positions, and 
therefore reduce the stability-related inequity. 
Positions in municipalities only constitute a small 
part of the physician market. Some policies might 
opt for increasing the attractiveness of GP positions 
in general, compared to other employment 
opportunities available for physicians. FLO can serve 
as an example. GPs are reportedly satisfied with FLO 
(see paragraph 3.13). FLO can therefore within this 
framework be interpreted as a measure that brought 
a positive change in x for GP positions in general, 
increasing the general stability. Paragraph 2.27 
concerns policy measures that may have similar 
effects. 
In this chapter I present a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the physician market and the geographical 
distribution of physicians. I distinguish between four 
types of policy measures: Those that increase the 
number of physician available for employment, those 
that are specifically targeted at increasing the 
attractiveness of unattractive positions, those that 
change physicians’ preferences for positions, and 
those that increase the general attractiveness of GP 
positions compared to positions in other physician 
market segments. I have discussed how each of these 
types of policy measures can have effect. In this 
thesis I have chosen to focus on those policies that 
affect the overall supply and demand for physicians. 
In the introduction I specified the policy targets for 
the government to be to minimize the number of 
vacant physician positions, to avoid inequitable 
distribution in vacant GP positions and in the 
instability of GPs and to maximize the stability of 
GPs. How do the policy measure categories I have 
established in this chapter relate to these policy 
targets? 
Limiting the number of physician positions in central 
areas might reduce the vacancy rate in rural areas, 
but will also cause physician positions to be vacant 
(or keep the positions from being established) in 
central areas. Promoting equity by reducing the 
quality of the GP service in central areas is probably 
not politically feasible. The regulation of physician 
positions has historically been targeted at limiting 
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positions at hospitals in central areas. None of the 
regulation regimes for physician positions have been 
effective (see paragraph 2.32). If they had been 
effective, denying hospitals access to physicians 
could very likely be of detriment to the specialist 
health service. Thus increased supply of physicians 
is apparently the only realistic method for reducing 
the number of vacancies. 
Increased supply of physicians can in addition to 
reducing the number of vacancies, increase stability 
in GP positions. Particularly if more physicians are 
educated at the medical faculties close to the rural 
areas with recruitment problems, there will be more 
of the type of physician that prefers to work in rural 
municipalities. 
Policy measures that can make GP positions in 
general more attractive compared to other 
employment opportunities for physicians, can lead 
to better overall quality in the GP health service by 
making physicians stay longer in GP positions, 
thereby promoting stability in the GP-patient 
relation. 
To reduce the inequitable patterns in vacancies and 
instability of GPs, the government can use policy 
measures that change the properties of unattractive 
physician positions, so that physicians find them 
more attractive. Or they may use policy measures 
that change the way physicians evaluate those 
positions, for example by giving them the choice of 
accepting the position or losing their physician 
authorization. 
For increased supply of physicians to lead to a 
reduction of vacancies in rural areas, one of two 
conditions needs to be fulfilled: The increased supply 
needs to include physicians of the type that prefers 
to work in rural municipalities. Or, if the supply of 
physicians increases sufficiently for existing 
employment opportunities in central areas to become 
saturated with physicians, positions in rural areas 
needs to be relatively attractive enough compared to 
other employment opportunities for physicians, for 
example abroad or in the market for privately 
financed health services. To what extent any or both 
of these are valid will determine the effectiveness of 
using increased supply of physicians as a policy 
measure to promote equity in GP services.  
The government should make sure that the supply of 
physicians are at the least sufficient to cover the 
public sector’s demand. Otherwise there will be 
geographical inequity, since rural positions are more 
unattractive than central ones, and systematic 
differences in vacancy rates between central and 
rural areas is not politically deemed socially just. 
(Inadequate supply of physicians is also likely to 
impair the production of health services.) If the 
supply of physicians is sufficient, physician positions 
in rural areas need to be seen as more attractive for a 
sufficient number of physicians than employment 
opportunities outside the public health care system 
in central parts of the country and abroad, in order to 
ensure recruitment. 
Above I mention four types of policy measures, 
which can be further aggregated into two types: 
Increasing the supply of physicians as one type, and 
measures working through changing the 
attractiveness of positions as the other type. If the 
aggregate market situation regarding supply and 
demand for physicians is the decisive factor behind 
the recruitment situation in rural areas, the vacancy 
rates in rural areas can be expected to be changing in 
correspondence to the market situation in the rest of 
the physician market over time. If increased supply 
of physicians is an unsuitable tool for improving the 
GP recruitment situation in rural areas, vacancy rates 
in rural areas should change independently of 
vacancy rates in the remaining physician market. 
Policies that make rural positions relatively more 
attractive becomes more efficient the more saturated 
the physician market is. This is because higher 
physician market saturation implies that 
inexperienced physicians seeking employment will 
have less attractive positions as alternatives to 
accepting employment in rural municipalities. 
Likewise, increased supply of physicians will work 
better at improving the recruitment situation in rural 
areas the more attractive those positions are. Based 
on this reasoning, both policies should be adopted. 
An underlying assumption here is that the 
employment opportunities in non-rural areas are 
limited, and at the margin increasingly unattractive 
with increased supply of physicians. If that is not the 
case, the recruitment situation in rural areas can only 
be improved by educating physicians of the type that 
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prefers to work there, or by increasing the 
attractiveness of positions in those areas. 
One prediction presented above is that vacancy rates 
in rural municipalities should follow those in the 
aggregate physician market, where the hospital-
sector is dominant. If vacancy rates in rural areas 
predominantly depend on the attractiveness of those 
positions, movements in vacancy rates in rural areas 
and in the hospital sector should be unrelated. But if 
the recruitment situation in rural areas is strongly 
influenced by the aggregate situation in the 
physician market, vacancy rates at hospitals and in 
rural municipalities should follow each other over 
time. But this argument cannot be reversed, hence it 
is not possible to draw an absolute conclusion solely 
based on this hypothesis. 
Chapter 5: EMPIRICS 
This chapter starts with a focus on the development 
of supply and demand in the physician market over 
time. Afterwards I will discuss validity-related 
limitations of the SSB work year data I have, and 
then use those data to look at the geographical 
pattern of vacancies and interns in the primary 
health service over time – mainly to search for trends 
along the center-periphery axis, but also to look for a 
possible minimum standard effect from FLO. 
I will now present time trends in variables from 
different sources that can shed light on 
developments in the overall physician market 
situation. The validity of the different data is variable 
– my focus has been to find variables that are 
consistent over time, rather than accurate at certain 
points in time. Some of the graphs are deflated with 
figures on population growth using 2001 as reference 
year. The population growth in Norway from 1986 to 
2004 was steady and ca 10% for the entire period. 
The first graph is based on work-year data from SSB 
on the municipality health service. I present these 
data and discuss their validity starting in paragraph 
5.4. Figure 3 shows time trends in physician work 
years, intern work years and unoccupied positions in 
the municipality health service.  
The figures behind the work year curve have been 
divided by 20, and is therefore on a different scale 
than the two other curves. The vacancies curve is 
approximately concave from 1994 to 2002 with top 
point in 1998. The movements in the curve for 
interns relates to changes in the education capacity 
(see the paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6). The number of 
interns increased dramatically particularly from 1999 
to 2001. From 2000 to 2002 there is an almost equally  
Figure 3 Physician work years, interns and 
vacancies in the primary health service 1986-2004 
(population deflated) 
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large drop in vacancies. Table 3 shows the exact 
figures for the years 1999-2004, not adjusted for 
population growth. Four municipalities with missing 
values for each of the years 2002 and 2003 were 
deleted from the data set prior to extracting the 
figures in table 3. Interns are at the last stage of the 
physician education and receive their authorization 
when the intern service is completed. The table 
shows that there is a match between the reduction in 
vacancies and the growth in interns one year earlier. 
But at municipality level there is little 
correspondence between the increase in interns and 
reduction in vacancies, hence the conclusion that the 
increase in interns caused the reduction in vacancies 
is not supported by the data. 
Because of the increase in domestic education 
capacity for physicians in the 1990s (see the 
paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6), I expected the intern figures 
to be in steady increase. The decline in interns from 
2001 may have to do with a reduced influx of foreign 
physicians from countries from which physicians are 
required by SAFH to do a Norwegian intern service 
prior to acquiring a Norwegian physician 
authorization, or changes in regulations regarding 
these requirements. 
The most striking features of the work year time 
series, is the jump between 2000 and 2001, and the 
reduction between 2002 and 2003. The jump from 
2000 to 2001 must be seen in relation with the 
introduction of FLO. A contributing factor behind 
the jump may have been private practice GPs that 
until then did not have a government contract, and 
accepted a FLO type contract with the government 
when FLO was introduced (see paragraph 2.22).  
Most of these were located in Oslo. Increased student 
classes emerging as interns and physicians, the 
improved working conditions physicians got with 
FLO (see paragraph 3.13) may have created the 
supply of physicians seeking GP positions in 2001. 
The minimum standard imposed by FLO (see 
paragraph 2.20) may have created the demand from 
the municipalities. These factors are probable 
contributing factors behind the jump in work years 
and reduction in vacancies from 2000 to 2001. 
The growth rate of GP work years in the 
municipality health service seems to have been 
reduced after 2001 when FLO was introduced. 
Possible contributing factors can be that GPs have 
gotten more efficient with the introduction of the 
FLO contracts, reducing the number of needed 
positions (see paragraph 3.12). The changes between 
2000-2001 in vacancies and GP position 
attractiveness may have pushed more rural 
municipalities out of bad recruitment spirals or into 
good recruitment spirals, as discussed in paragraph 
3.4. Increased stability may have lead to increased 
efficiency and quality, reducing the need for 
physician work year as counted in the SSB data.  
The municipality health service is only a small part 
of the total physician market – the specialist health 
service, particularly hospitals, employs a larger share 
of the physician work force. Figure 4 contains data 
on work years and vacancies in the municipality and 
the specialist health services. The work year data is 
from SSB for both sectors. The figures on vacancies in 
the specialist health services are from SHDir42, and 
may be less reliable than the others. (The physician 
position regulation regime has been ineffective (see 
paragraph 2.28), and it is therefore not unlikely that 
the regulators’ figures are unreliable. Hopefully the 
unreliability is time consistent.) The graph for 
specialist health service work years is based on the 
sum of work years in psychiatric institutions and 
somatic hospitals43. The figures on private practice 
specialists are not comparable across the jump from 
1997 to 1998, because of the change discussed in 
paragraph 2.14. The figures on physicians in 
positions outside the publicly financed health system 
are from DNLF. Note the different scale for the work 
year curves – those have been divided by 10 in order 
to fit the curves into the figure. 
Figure 4 show s that the growth in physician work 
years in hospitals and psychiatric institutions has 
been substantial and much higher than the growth in 
the primary health service. The data indicates that 
the vacancy rate in the specialist health service has 
been substantially higher than in the primary health 
service. The development in the vacancy rates in the 
specialist and primary health services have similar 
trends starting in 1994, with growth to a peak in 
1998, then decline. It seems that the shortage of 
                                                                 
42 Through the DNLF web site section with physician statistics. See 
www.legeforeningen.no. 
43 The figures are taken from Statistics Norway (2002). 
 31 
Figure 4 Physician work year and vacancies in the primary and specialist health services 1986-2005 
(population deflated)  
physicians have been driven by large growth in 
demand from the specialist health service sector. The 
vacancy rate at hospitals was high throughuot the 
1990s, with a peak of around 10% in 1998. The 
vacancy rate in the primary health service has overall 
been lower throughout the entire period, but has 
followed a similar trend. 
The number of physicians in privately financed 
positions is limited and in decline. The number of 
physician work years in private specialist practices 
(with government funding) is stable or in decline. 
These two data series were included to show that 
these segments of the physician market have not 
contributed to the increased demand for physicians. 
5.1 Based on the work year data shown in Figure 4, I 
have estimated sector-wise growth rates using OLS44. 
The growth rate of physicians in the specialist health 
service institutions has been just about twice that of 
the growth rate of physician positions in the 
                                                                 
44 I have regressed time against the natural logarithm of the work 
year time series. The growth rate will then be estimated by the slope 
coefficient. 
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municipality health service. Population growth is not 
included here. A 3.4% growth rate in the number of 
physicians annually translates to about 2.8% annual 
growth in physicians per inhabitant, since 
population growth is approximately 0.6% each year. 
The HELSEMOD-projections behind Table 2 use 
2.4% as the growth rate of demand for physician in 
its scenario with highest growth rate, and 1.7% as 
projected growth rate in physician supply (also 
estimated using OLS). 
Table 4 OLS-estimated  sector-wise growth rates in 
physician work years 
 OLS-
estimated 
growth 
rate 
Work 
years 
in 
2005 
“Expected” 
Growth 
Municipalities 0.0229 4073 (2004) 93.1 
Psychiatry 0.0453 1411 63.9 
Somatic 
hospitals 0.0462 8199 378.9 
Private 
specialists 0.0012 731 0.9 
Privately 
financed -0.0881 328 -28.9 
Sum 0.034 (weighted) 14742 507.9 
Thus the historical growth rate of physician positions 
has been higher than the figures used in even the 
high-growth scenario from the HELSEMOD-
calculations. This makes it natural to questions the 
realism of the HELSEMOD estimates. 
I have acquired data directly from SAFH on the 
number of physicians receiving Norwegian 
physician authorization, for each year 1986-2005 and 
by the country of the physicians’ basic medical 
education. The data set only include physicians that 
are alive today. It should be reasonable to assume 
that most physicians relocate or finalize their 
education well within the life segments where 
mortality is low, hence this should not be too large a 
problem. The data does not include entries on 
citizenship, nor does it say anything about for how 
long, if at all, the physician has stayed or worked in 
Norway. Physicians can also function in Norway by 
having licenses, which are more limited in time or in 
terms of type of practice than authorizations. I have 
not investigated the relationship between the 
authorization and licence institutes closely.  
Thus the SAFH data presented below have poor 
validity. But they are time consistent in terms of 
being an indicator for the total influx of physician to 
the supply side of the Norwegian physician market, 
assuming the time horizon mix of these physicians 
has not changed over time – which might not be the 
case, so I should be careful when interpreting 
findings based on these data. 
Figure 5 has population-deflated curves. It has a 
graph showing the sum of the variables for vacant 
positions in the primary and specialist health service, 
as they are shown in Figure 4. The two vacancy 
variables are not directly comparable since they are 
derived through different means – the graph for 
vacant positions in Figure 5 should be interpreted as 
an indicator only. 
Physicians from non-European OECD countries are 
almost non-existent in the data set from SAFH. Prior 
to 2004 Poland and Hungary are important countries 
behind the non-EU/non-Nordic figures. These have 
become popular countries for Norwegian medical 
students. The jump from 2003 to 2004 in the EU/EEA 
graph can mainly be attributed to increased influx of 
German physicians (from 116 in 2003 to 191 in 2004) 
as well as the reclassification of eastern European 
countries to EU countries (also behind the drop in 
the non-EU/non-Nordic curve between 2003 and 
2004) – but there was only a small increase in the 
number of authorizations given to physicians with 
their education from the countries that joined the EU 
in 2004. 
The curve for Norway in Figure 5 is remarkably 
stable. The drop from 2002 to 2004 is surprising, as 
the domestic education capacity was increased 
throughout the 1990s. This raises a question – is the 
completion rate for students at Norwegian medical 
schools fluctuating, or even declining? Can the 
completion rate be dependant on the domestic 
physician market situation? 
Figure 5 should include everything from Norwegian 
and foreign physicians permanently establishing 
themselves in Norway, to foreign physicians that 
planned to work in Norway for a shorter period, 
acquired an authorization but reversed their plans 
and never entered Norway. It is likely that 
physicians stay for a longer period the harder it is for  
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Figure 5 Physician authorizations by education country group and vacant positions over time (population 
deflated) 
them to acquire the authorization and relocate. 
Cultural and language barriers can be seen as costs 
for physicians and could reinforce the same pattern. 
Thus there are probably more short-term substitutes 
behind the Nordic curve than the non-EU/non-
Nordic curve. Though making conclusions about the 
relative quantitative contribution in terms of work 
years from physicians from the different country 
groups should not be made based on these data. 
5.2 What is important in Figure 5 is the shape of the 
curves – from almost zero in 1992, to a peak around 
1998-1999, then a decline to 2001, and stability after 
that. The decline does not imply fewer foreign 
physicians in Norway, since authorizations issued 
earlier years do not expire, but it indicates reduced 
influx. Specifically, if the mix of foreign physicians 
given authorization in terms of how long they stay in 
Norway for work is constant over the years, the 
reduction in the Nordic and EU curves shows a 
decline in the growth rate of the foreign physician 
workforce in Norway, possibly to a negative 
number. The influx of foreign physicians seems to be 
in accordance with the undersupply situation of 
physicians in Norway. This gives support to the 
point of view that net physician migration to 
Norway depends on the Norwegian physician 
market situation. 
Figure 5 supports the notion that the undersupply of 
physicians in Norway created by strong growth in 
the hospital sector and insufficient education 
capacity of Norwegian physicians during the 1990 
lead to foreign physicians becoming an important 
part of the Norwegian health care system. 
On their web pages DNLF has statistics on the 
number of Norwegian medical students abroad per 
country back to 1994/1995, shown in Table 5. Their 
source is the State Educational Loan Fund. Since 1994 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and (since 
2002) Slovakia have become important education 
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countries for Norwegian physicians. Norwegians 
studying abroad are important contributors to the 
growth in the non-EU/non-Nordic curve in Figure 5. 
Denmark and Germany are two other important 
education countries for Norwegian medical students. 
Table 5 Norwegian medical students abroad 
School year Number of students 
1994-1995 579 
1996-1997 963 
1998-1999 1423 
2000-2001 1817 
2001-2002 1880 
2002-2003 1934 
2003-2004 2008 
2004-2005 2093 
2005-2006 2212 
Most of the increase from 2004/2005 to 2005/2006 
came in Eastern European countries – as an example, 
the figure for Poland went from 533 to 667. The 
figures in Table 5 show a strong growth in the 
number of students during the 2nd half of the 1990s, 
and then reduced growth from 2000. The completion 
rate for Norwegian medical students abroad has 
historically been lower than for the domestic medical 
students. The HELSEMOD reports (see paragraph 
3.14) assumes a completion rate for Norwegian 
medical students abroad at 80%, while Bertelsen 
(1998) operates with 60%. 
5.3 The figures in Table 5 does not separate students 
according to how long they have studied. The 
reduced growth rate from 1994-2000 to 2001-2005 
might imply a reduction in the number of first-year 
students. This is consistent with the view that the 
number of students undertaking medical studies 
abroad is elastic to the domestic physician market 
situation: According to these figures it is possible or 
even likely that the number of first year students 
were highest from 1995-1998 when the undersupply 
of physicians were at its peak and reduced when the 
vacancy rates later dropped. 
Bertelsen (1998) has some historical data on medical 
students. From 1956 to 1991, 3572 physicians with 
foreign education received a Norwegian 
authorization. During the same time period 9951 
physicians educated by Norwegian institutions 
received an authorization. Most of these were 
Norwegian. Historically a large proportion of 
Norwegian physicians have received their education 
abroad. 
From the aggregate physician market situation I 
move over to the geographical distribution of GPs. 
First I present the data I have on GP distribution and 
discuss validity issues. 
5.4 When the municipality health service bill was 
introduced in 1984, statistics Norway started to make 
routines to collect statistical data on the municipality 
health service. They have made available annual 
data starting from 1986. I have accessed the data 
through  Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
(NSD), which at the time of analysis had data 
available for the years from 1986 to 2004. I have used 
2001 as reference year regarding municipality 
borders. The data describes the situation on the 31st 
of December of the respective year. The unit of 
measurement is hours per week, which is 
recalculated into work years, with one work year 
being equivalent to 37.5 hours per week, except for 
1986 when the standard workweek for physicians 
was 38 hours. Overtime is not included (except 
planned overtime, see paragraph 2.9), and neither is 
work hours from emergency physician services. 
There are few municipalities with missing values, 
and the number of missing values is declining over 
time. There is no center-periphery pattern in the 
municipalities with missing values, hence the 
missing values do not produce a bias in this context. 
The variables for the years prior to 1994 are not 100% 
consistent with the variables from 1994 and later. For 
1986, 1987 and 1993 figures from institutions for the 
elderly and disabled are not included, while it is 
included for the rest of the years. For 1988-1993 the 
prison health service is included, but it is not 
included from 1994 and onwards. It is possible to do 
corrections to the data material and get more 
consistent time series, but the discrepancies are so 
small that they should not constitute a significant 
problem. Therefore I have not prioritized to make 
these corrections. 
I use three variable types – the number of physician 
work years in the municipality health service in total, 
the number of intern work years in the municipality 
service in total, and the number of unoccupied 
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physician positions in the municipality health 
service. 
5.5 For these three variables I have consistent time 
series from 1994 to 2004, the only exception being 
that there is no data on the number of unoccupied 
physician positions from 2004, as SSB has decided to 
stop collecting that information. Selecting these three 
variables includes a choice to use the municipality 
health service as the analytical unit, instead of 
separating out physicians working in general 
practice. This is in accordance with what I specify in 
the introduction. This choice is made partly in order 
to get consistent time series, and partly in order to 
not make judgements on how the municipalities 
dispose their physician resources between clinical 
work and other duties. 
Another data source that could have been practical 
to use is the FLO database (“Fastlegedatabasen”). Its 
disadvantage is that it does not go further back in 
time than 2001, when FLO was introduced. 
The Norwegian center-periphery axis is a theoretical 
construct that involves ranking geographical units 
according to how rural or central they are. It is 
commonly used in political science, as the center-
periphery dimension in Norwegian politics always 
has been a source for political conflict. I will use a 
prefabricated indicator variable to depict the 
centrality and rurality of the municipalities. The 
most commonly used centrality indicator variable is 
constructed by SSB. I will, however, use the 
centrality indicator variable developed by the 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional 
Research (NIBR)45. The NIBR indicator is more in 
terms with my perception of Norwegian geography 
than the SSB indicator, and produce larger and more 
consistent statistical differences between central and 
rural municipalities. The NIBR variable comes in two 
variants, NIBR5 and NIBR11, the figure in the name 
representing the number of discrete levels. The 
NIBR11 divides each of the NIBR5 categories into 
two depending on the size of the regional labor 
market, and adds a category for Oslo. Otherwise the 
two variants are equivalent. I will use NIBR5 to keep 
the number of categories to a manageable and 
presentable level. 
                                                                 
45 From Foss and Selstad (1997). 
Next I turn to the data and look for patterns across 
the center-periphery dimension. The most striking 
feature of the physician work year data is the 
distributional pattern of physician work years per 
inhabitant across municipality size or the center-
periphery axis. This is illustrated in figure 6. The left 
hand axis is physicians per inhabitant and the 
horizontal axis is the natural logarithm of the 
number of inhabitants. Municipalities are the units. 
Each character in the plot in figure 6 accounts for one 
or more observations – an asterix is one observation, 
a figure represents that number of observations, 
except for 0, which is 10 observations. An A is 11 
observations, and a Z indicates 37 or more 
observations. The other letters represent a number of 
observations between 11 and 37 according to the 
letter’s position in the alphabet. The plot is based on 
a data set with observations from all years 1986-2004. 
The cluster to the right is the observations for Oslo. 
With its banana-shape of points, figure 6 clearly 
shows that the measured physician density on 
average is higher in small municipalities than in 
larger municipalities. How can this be, when the 
literature (and many other sources) says smaller 
municipalities are the ones with recruitment 
problems? Below I discuss different explanations 
behind the observed pattern in Figure 6. 
The work year data does not include work from 
emergency GP services, nor does it include overtime. 
This is intended (see paragraph 5.4). Though from 
the patient's view, GP services received outside 
standard work hours counts. If the quantity of these 
services varies systematically geographically and not 
randomly, this becomes problematic. Kjekshus and 
Tjora (1998) wrote that many rural municipalities 
with recruitment problems use short term substitutes 
with strong monetary objectives, and implies that 
these were inclined to provide more services outside 
office hours (see paragraph 3.3). This effect could 
mean that actual work hours used in the production 
of GP services in smaller municipalities are, relative 
to larger municipalities, even higher than indicated 
in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Scatterplot of physician work years in municipalities per inhabitant, against ln(population) (1986-
2004) 
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The scatterplot below is made the exact same way as the one above, except that 0,5 has been deducted from the 
work year figures prior to dividing them by the number of inhabitants to calculate the municipality physician 
density. 
Figure 7 Scatterplot of (physician work years – 0.5) per inhabitant in the municipality, against ln(population) 
(1986-2004) 
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There may be scale benefits in the production of GP 
services in the municipality health service. These 
might arise from for example administrative and 
community health medicine duties, which varies less 
with municipality size than clinical work. Smaller 
(and more rural) municipalities usually have higher 
workload from emergency GP services than larger 
municipalities. The productivity of the GP the day 
following a night with sleep deprivation and unrest 
might be considerably lower than normal. The GP 
may even be absent. Distance to specialist health 
service resources and the geographical population 
pattern within the municipality may also affect the 
relationship between how much time the GP spend 
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at work and the total quality of physician services 
received by the population. 
The scatterplot below is made the exact same way as 
the one above, except that 0.5 has been deducted 
from the work year figures prior to dividing them by 
the number of inhabitants to calculate the 
municipality physician density. 
The difference between these two scatterplots is 
consistent with the presence of scale benefits in the 
production of GP services in municipalities. 
However, the decisive factor that renders 
comparison of the total quality of the GP service 
between municipalities of different population size 
or different centrality-periphery status impossible 
with the work year data from statistics Norway, is 
the breakdown of validity of the data found by 
Kjekshus and Tjora (1998) in municipalities with 
instability in the GP workforce. As I wrote in 
paragraph 3.6, they found that municipalities which 
according to the work year data had high physician 
density, in some cases had a high degree of 
instability in their GP workforce, relied on short term 
substitutes, and had an expensive and inefficient GP 
service, which due to the instability of the physicians 
might even have been of poorer quality than the GP 
service of municipalities with a lower observed 
physician work year figure. 
The relationship between GP work years and GP 
services received by the population is unknown, and 
the work year data does not tell anything about 
stability (directly), which is vital for the quality of GP 
services. Thus I cannot draw any conclusions 
concerning the distribution of total GP services 
quality along the center periphery or municipality 
size dimension for municipalities based on the SSB 
work year data. Carlsen (2006) avoids these 
fundamental methodological problems by instead 
using survey data on patient reported satisfaction 
with the GP service. 
The most interesting variables among the GP data 
from SSB therefore becomes those that describe the 
number of unoccupied positions. As Kjekshus and 
Tjora point out (see paragraph 3.5), a vacant position 
in the data does not necessarily describe an actual 
shortage of physicians. Although there is no fixed 
relationship, vacancies correlates with recruitment 
problems, instability and physician shortage (see 
paragraph 3.18). I will use vacancy rates, calculated 
as the number of vacant positions divided by the 
sum of physician work years and vacant positions. 
An important quality of the SSB data is that it is 
time-consistently available for each year over a long 
period. 
Figure 8 describes the geographical distribution of 
vacancies over time by NIBR5 ranking. 
Figure 8 Vacancy rates in municipality physician 
positions per centrality over time 
Figure 8 shows that vacancy rates are generally 
substantially higher in rural than central 
municipalities. The difference is large over the entire 
time period. The policies that have been used have 
not been sufficient to reach the governemnt’s policy 
targets regarding equity in the GP health service. The 
concavity in the vacancy rate seen in Figure 3 
between 1994 and 2003 is recognizable in all NIBR5 
centrality categories. The relative difference between 
rural and central municipalities is larger when the 
overall vacancy rate is low, and vice versa for the 
absolute difference. The jump in vacancy rates from 
2002 to 2003 seen in Figure 3 seems to only have 
affected the most rural municipalities. 
5.6 Figure 9 can be harder to interpret. The left hand 
axis is for vacancy rate. The municipalities are for 
each year sorted by vacancy rate. The topmost line 
describes the vacancy rate in the municipality that is 
1% down from the municipality with the 
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Figure 9 Percentiles of vacancy rates per year 
 
highest vacancy rate, for each year. Since there are 
435 municipalities, this will be the municipality with 
the 4th highest vacancy rate. This may be a different 
municipality each year. The 2nd topmost line 
represents the municipality with the (100-98)*435 = 
(8.7, which rounds off to 9) 9th highest vacancy rate 
that year. And so on further down – each line 
represents one percentile in the municipality vacancy 
rate ranking. All percentiles with vacancy rate larger 
than zero are included in the figure. 
Figure 9 shows that the 10% of the municipalities 
with highest vacancy rate have had a vacancy rate 
around 20% or higher throughout the entire period. 
In the peak year 1998, 168 of the 435 municipalities 
(39%) had vacant physician positions. In 2003 23% of 
the municipalities had vacancies. From this figure it 
might seem as the concave trend, as seen in Figure 3, 
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 8 started at the end of 
the 1980s, had a disturbance in 1993-1994, and 
continued to 2002. There also seems to be a reversal 
in the trend towards a reduction in vacancies 
between 2002 and 2003. 
We have now seen that the vacancy rates in the most 
rural municipalities have a concave trend from 1994 
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to 2002 with a peak in 1998 (figure 8), the vacancy 
rates in the municipality health service as a whole 
follow the same trend (figure 3 and 9). The vacancy 
rates at hospitals and the influx of foreign physicians 
follow almost the same trend in this time period. The 
difference is that the two latter have a large drop 
between 1998 and 2000, with 2000 being the end 
point of the concave trend, whereas the curves for 
the municipality health service stay concave to 2002 
with a decline between 2000 and 2002. This 
discrepancy can be seen in relation to the large 
increase in salaries at hospitals prior to 1998 (see 
paragraph 2.10), which reduced the relative 
attractiveness of GP positions, and that the 
subsequent changes brought by FLO (see paragraph 
2.23 and 3.13) may have offset that by making GP 
positions more attractive. What I find here is 
consistent with the prediction at the end of chapter 4, 
and in support of the theoretical framework in that 
chapter. 
Next I look at the center-periphery dimension of 
intern distribution over time, shown in figure 10. 
The work-year contribution from interns is relatively 
higher the more rural the municipality. There were 
relatively larger growth of work years from interns 
in rural than in central municipalities around 1999-
2001. But there is minimal correspondence between 
 
Figure 10 Interns’ Work-share per centrality over time 
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more interns and less vacancies in the data on 
municipality level. Thus there is no direct link 
between the drop in vacancies and the increase in 
interns. 
5.7 Now I turn to discussing FLO. As I wrote in 
paragraph 2.20 the list patient reform may have had 
a distributional effect through imposing a minimum 
standard. To look for this effect in the data I use the 
number of physician positions, equal to the number 
of physician work years plus the number of 
vacancies. Municipalities can have established new 
physician positions to comply with the minimum 
standard without having been successful in 
recruiting physicians to them. 
Figure 11 shows percentile graphs (similar to figure 
9) of the number of inhabitants per physician 
position, occupied or not, of the 30% of the 
municipalities with highest population to physician 
ratio – over time. Note that a high population per 
physician figure implies low physician density. See 
paragraph 5.6 for an explanation of the percentile 
graph concept. 
 
Figure 11 Population per physician position in the 30% “worst” municipalities, over time. 
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Some municipalities may have a low physician per 
population ratio because many inhabitants choose to 
use GPs in other municipalities, because of for 
example regional commuting patterns. It is not 
shown here, but it is important to note that most of 
the municipalities with low physician to population 
ratio are not rural, but central, and therefore should 
have few recruitment problems compared to more 
rural municipalities. Figure 11 shows that the 
physician position density took a jump up from 2000 
(pre-FLO) to 2001 (post-FLO46), and that the jump 
generally was higher for the municipalities with 
lowest physician position density. But 2001 seems to 
be an exception – in 2002 and 2003 the physician 
position density in most of these municipalities 
decrease, seen as upward-sloping curves in those 
years. 
I suggest two explanations: When FLO was 
introduced municipalities adhered to the minimum 
standard and created more GP positions. Because 
people are free to choose in which municipality they 
want to have their regular GP, people’s choices 
where in accordance with their old habits and 
regional commuting patterns. In 2002 the 
municipalities had had time to adjust the number of 
GP work years in accordance with this. The second 
explanation concerns the overall decrease in 
physician density. Since these municipalities in 
general are central and do not have recruitment 
problems, the decrease is unlikely to be there 
because of vacancies. Rather, it might have to do 
with a productivity increase following FLO (see 
paragraph 3.12). These explanations are only 
suggestions, and not conclusions. 
Chapter 6: POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In 1983 a report predicted a future oversupply of 
physicians in Norway. The education capacity was 
reduced. The physician market situation in the 1990 
was dominated by a serious undersupply of 
physicians, mainly driven by strong growth in 
                                                                 
46 The data describe the situation at the end of each year. See 
paragraph 5.4. 
demand from the hospital sector. The education 
capacity reduction in the 1980s did not contribute 
positively to the situation. Physicians started to work 
longer hours (paragraph 2.9) and were rewarded 
(paragraph 2.10). But the most important answer to 
the problem came from abroad – the use of foreign 
physicians on longer or shorter work visits became 
crucial for the Norwegian health service throughout 
the 1990s. The education capacity for Norwegian 
medical students was increased and this gave results 
in the form of more physicians starting around 2000, 
but the increase has so far been insufficient to supply 
enough physicians to meet the demand. 
As I write in the introduction, the government 
should have policies that maximizes the stability of 
GPs, minimize GP position vacancy rates and 
promotes equity in both in order to secure an 
efficient and equitable GP health service. In chapter 4 
I argue that the government can use two types of 
policy measures to reach its policy goals regarding 
the geographical physician distribution – securing a 
high level of supply of physicians, and increasing the 
relative attractiveness of physician positions 
particularly in rural areas. Based on my discussion 
both policies should be adopted, as they both 
increase the efficacy of the other. 
Since the period in the 1990s with highest physician 
position vacancy rates, there has been a focus on 
measures targeted at improving the physician 
recruitment situation in rural areas. I have referred to 
a few of these measures in the background and 
literature chapter. The data on vacancy rates I use in 
the empirical chapter does not seem to indicate any 
dramatic change between rural and central 
municipalities over the last years. It is difficult to 
draw conclusions regarding the possible 
effectiveness of these policies based on the data I 
have. An in-detail evaluation of the effectiveness of 
these is beyond the scope of this thesis. Though what 
is evident is that current policies have not been 
sufficient to even out inequities in vacancy rates and 
stability in GP positions between central and rural 
parts of the country. 
Regarding the other type of policy measure, 
increased supply of physicians, I am more able to 
draw conclusions. As written in chapter 4, a critical 
question here is whether the vacancy rate in rural 
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municipalities is affected by the overall supply 
situation on the physician market. The developments 
I find in the data support that notion: Increasing the 
supply of physicians seems to be an efficacious 
policy measure for reaching the government’s policy 
goals for the physician distribution. Though this 
policy tool has not been used sufficiently – 
throughout the entire period, the vacancy rates in 
both hospitals and the primary health service has 
ben sustainably at high levels. The Norwegian 
education capacity for physicians has not been 
sufficiently high for the supply of physicians to meet 
demand. What can be said about the future? 
The government’s main tool for planning supply and 
demand for physicians, the HELSEMOD reports 
(paragraph 3.14), are based on dubious assumptions: 
The number of Norwegians undertaking medical 
studies abroad is likely to be dependent on the 
physician market situation in Norway (paragraph 
5.3), as is the net influx of physician from abroad – it 
is likely that fewer foreign physicians will come if it 
gets harder to find employment, and vice versa 
(paragraph 5.2). Also, more Norwegian physicians 
might seek employment abroad instead of accepting 
positions in rural municipalities if the physician 
market becomes more saturated. The HELSEMOD 
reports assume absolute inelasticity in the number of 
medical students and net migration of physicians. 
They also assume that the demand for physicians 
was met by the supply in 2004, and there is 
absolutely nothing in the data material I have looked 
at that supports that notion. Their high-growth 
scenario points towards future undersupply of 
physicians, and use a growth rate in physician work 
years below what it has been over the past 10-20 years 
(Table 2). The figures for medical student completion 
rates that the HELSEMOD-calculations use are 
questionable (see below Table 5 and the discussion of 
Figure 5). Given the state of the assumptions the 
HELSEMOD calculations rely on, the conclusion 
must be that the validity of the estimates are low. 
The calculations are biased towards underestimating 
the need for increased supply of physicians in 
Norway. 
The HELSEMOD-estimates could probably be 
improved, but predicting the future 10-15 years 
ahead is bound to be difficult. Given the inevitable 
uncertainty of the future, a prudent perspective 
when deciding the education capacity for physicians 
could be risk-averseness, and the adoption of a goal 
of prevention of physician shortage to avoid 
conditions similar to how it has been in Norway over 
the last 20 years. Such a policy could involve a 
dramatic increase in domestic education capacity for 
physicians. Educating physicians costs money, but 
paying physicians to work overtime or hiring 
substitutes from abroad costs money too, and not 
having physicians available for employment at all is 
most likely of detriment to the health services (not) 
received by the population. A feature article in 
TDNLF in 200047 says that the price of one medical 
school student for one year to be around NOK 200 
000 – 300 000. That points towards a total cost of 
educating a physician in the vicinity of NOK 2 
million. Given the salaries physicians earn and the 
value of the services they carry out, it will be 
surprising if costs of this magnitude will be 
prohibitive. Increased supply of physicians can have 
long-term effects on the salary level and on the 
demand for physicians from hospitals and 
municipalities as well, leading to cheaper and more 
(in terms of both quality and quantity) health 
services being produced. 
My policy recommendation is for the government to 
commission cost-benefit-oriented research with a 
risk-averseness perspective on the question 
regarding how much the education capacity for 
physicians should be increased. 
The government has a long history of trying to 
restrict the number of physician positions in central 
areas. Policies that have tried to limit growth in 
positions at hospitals in central parts of the country, 
have at least partially failed every time they have 
been in effect – in the 1970s and 1990s (paragraph 
3.1), and also the legal regulation in effect from 1999 
has not had the intended effect (paragraph 2.28). An 
interesting research question is to look at what 
concequences these measures would have had for 
the targeted hospitals when it comes to health 
service production, pressure on physicians to work 
overtime and physician salaries and budgets if such 
a regulation actually had been effective. A commonly 
held argument against increased education capacity 
                                                                 
47 "Vårt femte fakultet" by Geir Jacobsen. TDNLF no. 8 2000 
(volume 120) page 2326. 
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for physicians is that this will lead to increased costs 
for hospitals. Economically, limiting the supply of 
physicians as a part of cost control at hospitals seems 
senseless – the view should rather be that the 
production of health services in hospitals cannot be 
detrimented by giving the hospitals the choice to 
employ more physicians, and that a higher supply of 
physicians will lead to lower physician salaries over 
time. 
Prior to 1992 any physician could open up a general 
practice anywhere and receive FFS payments from 
RTV. If the FFS payments had not later been 
restricted to physicians with government contract 
only, the physician density in central parts of the 
country would probably have been higher. Giving 
any physician the eligibility to trigger FFS payments 
for the physician’s own treatment could also have 
caused strong incentives for supplier-induced 
demand. The current policy of limiting FFS 
payments to physicians with a government contract 
seems very wise.  
Since 1992 it has been impossible for physicians in a 
private practice without a government contract or 
without employment at a hospital to trigger 
payments to themselves from the public health 
system. There are no mechanisms that allow an 
unemployed physician to induce supply for their 
services and have the government pay for them. 
Thus the commonly held argument against 
increasing the education capacity for physicians that 
this will lead to problems with supplier induced 
demand is voided. 
Regardless of whether the direct regulation of the 
physician market is continued or not, it might be 
desirable for the government to monitor and perhaps 
limit the number of private practice physicians 
receiving FFS payments, in particular GPs in 
municipalities. Municipalities pay GPs per capita, 
and their expenditures are not directly affected by 
the number of GPs in the municipality. Hence 
municipalities may wish to give contracts to a large 
number of GPs, in order to increase the amount of 
GP services received by their population. RTV will 
take the bill if increased use of GP services is the 
consequence. In this light perhaps it can be better to 
have RTV issue permits to municipalities for GP 
positions instead of HD or SHDir - especially if the 
current regulation regime is abandoned. 
I have given FLO limited attention, because FLO 
seems to have had limited impact on the physician 
distribution, at least compared to the aggregate 
supply and demand situation, which I have focused 
on. FLO imposed a minimum standard, but this had 
little impact in the work year data (paragrap 5.7). 
FLO might have given a productivity boost in some 
rural municipalities because of change to more 
incentive-oriented contracts, but such an effect will 
most likely take some time to appear in the data to 
an extent that makes conclusions possible.  
As discussed in the theory chapter, an important 
effect from FLO may be on the overall stability of 
GPs, by increasing the attractiveness of GP positions 
compared to other employment opportunities 
physicians have. The salary increased, but more 
important in the long run may be the effect of the 
changes in the organisational working conditions 
(paragraph 3.13). Many non-monetary concerns are 
relevant for physicians when they choose position, as 
I point out at the start of chapter 4. It could be 
interesting to look into how GP positions can be 
made more attractive for physicians through other 
ways than raising the salary. In 2006 the government 
has set aside money for GP oriented research 
(paragraph 2.27) – that can be a step in the right 
direction. 
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